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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
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behalf of themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated, both as taxpayers of the 
City of Ogden and as residents and homeowners 
in a dedicated subdivision of Ogden City. 
The Appellants seek a determination as to 
whether or not an ordinance passed by Ogden 
City closing and vacating a public street/ 
which is a part of the dedicated subdivision 
in Argonne Park Plat, and the giving of that 
street to the Ogden City Board of Education 
without any compensation whatsoever being 
paid to the Appellants, was a valid exercise 
of the authority and power of the Ogden City 
Council, and further, whether the closing 
off and taking away of a dedicated street in 
a private dedicated subdivision without the 
consent of the qualified electors of the 
City of Ogden or the homeowners of the platted 
subdivision and without payment of considera-
tion constitutes the taking of property 
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without Due Process of Law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants, who were the Plaintiffs 
in the Lower Court, having filed a class 
action as provided for under 78-33-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended in 1953, seek a 
determination of the right of the Respondents, 
who were the Defendants in the action in the 
Lower Court, to vacate the aforesaid public 
and dedicated street and the authority of 
Ogden City to give said street by Quit Claim 
Deed to the Ogden City Board of Education 
without the payment of any compensation whatso 
ever to any of the property owners residing 
in the dedicated Plat, wherein the City street 
is a part thereof, and without the consent 
of the electorate for the giving of said 
property to the Ogden City Board of Education. 
Ttie Lower Court, at the time of a hearing 
on a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 
-3-
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and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, granted 
an Order and Judgment granting dismissal of 
the class action of the Plaintiffs with 
prejudice, thereby validating the action of 
the Ogden City Council in the closing of the 
street and the giving of same by Quit Claim 
Deed to the Ogden City Board of Education. 
The Appellants seek a reversal of the 
dismissal in the Lower Court and a Declaratory 
Order from the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah as to the matters set forth in the 
Complaint of the Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 31, 1921, a dedication Plat was 
submitted to Ogden City for the purpose of 
additioning Argonne Park to Ogden City, request-
ing that the same be dedicated and that the 
annexed Plat be set apart and the dedicated 
streets be used as a public thoroughfare 
forever. CR-26) 
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The Plat was accepted by Ogden City as an 
addition and the street in question, which is 
29th Street from Harrison Boulevard to Tyler 
Avenue was a part of Argonne Park, together 
with an area from Harrison Boulevard to Polk 
Avenue and from 28th Street through to 29th 
Street. The dedicated plat contained streets 
and many lots. (R-26) The City Recorder 
certified the annexed plat of Argonne Park 
Addition as accepted by the Board of Commis-
sioners of Ogden City on the 1st day of 
February, 1921. (R-27) 
The Plaintiffs herein, as well as the 
class represented, in the instant cause of 
action before this Court represents persons 
who are homeowners in the area dedicated as 
Argonne Park, as well as other citizens who 
reside on the East Bench of Ogden City and 
have reason to use 29th Street as an arterial 
thoroughfare in order to traverse to their 
-5-
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homes and property. (R-112, Pl.Exh.B and C) 
The Ogden City Mayor and Council passed 
an ordinance No. 1-74, which ordinance would 
vacate 29th Street as a public street from 
the east line of Harrison Boulevard to the 
west line of Tyler Avenue on the east and did 
convey said property by Quit Claim Deed to 
the Ogden City Board of Education. (R-27, R-
751 
The Ogden City Board of Education maintains 
a high school, which is in an abutting area 
on both sides of 29th Street between Harrison 
Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, and desires the 
acquisition of said property and its use for 
tlie purpose of preventing its use as a public 
thoroughfare. Conveyance of the City dedicated 
street was made by a Quit Claim Deed to the 
Ogden City Board of Education and no considera-
tion was paid by said Board of Education for 
the acquisition of said public street. (R-80) 
-6-
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That at a regular session of the Ogden 
City Planning Commission held January 2, 1974, 
a resolution was adopted, that the request of 
the Ogden City School Board for the closure 
of the 29th Street area be denied, in that 
the advantages to be derived from closure 
of said street was not sufficiently substantial 
to warrant the closure of an established, 
improved, and long-used street, (R-4) 
The Weber County Planning Commission, in 
its report of August 31, 1973, in its response 
to a request to review the Ogden City Board 
of Education's Petition, to vacate said street, 
advised that the vacating was not in the best 
interest of the citizens of Ogden City, in 
that the use of said street would not consti-
tute a safety hazard to the students using 
the facilities of the school abutting said 
street and that the closure was being sought 
on the basis of esthetic values. (R-49, -50) 
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A traffic engineering study was made by 
the Ogden Area Transportation Study Staff 
and submitted by Donald E. Godfrey, recommended 
that after a traffic engineering study, that 
the study was supportive of the position taken 
by the Traffic Department in a joint memoran-
dum to R. L. Larson, Ogden City Manager, 
dated August 31, 1973, wherein the study showed 
that the aforesaid street did not constitute 
a hazard necessitating its closure. (R-44) 
The Greater Ogden Chamber of Commerce 
Board of Directors, at a meeting held 
September 21, 1973, passed a resolution that 
the Board of the Chamber was opposed to the 
closing of the aforesaid street. 
That the exhibits presently before the 
Court consisting of the Petition of the residents 
of the area of Argonne Park, together with the 
Petition of citizens who are residents of the 
area adjacent to Argonne Park and who are users 
-8-
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of said street, as well as an editorial in 
the Ogden Standard Examiner, all objecting 
to and in opposition to the closure of said 
street. (R-49, R-58) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN DEDICATED 
STREET. 
The Appellants herein are persons who are 
homeowners and are the purchasers of lots 
which was originally dedicated in the Argonne 
Park, and that as a part of the dedicated 
plat contained as one of the streets therein, 
the public street which the City of Ogden has 
quit claimed to the Ogden City Board of 
Education. (R-55, R-59) 
This Court had reason to decide the owner-
ship rights of individual lot holders in a 
dedicated plat in the case of Tuttle vs. 
Sowadzki, et al, 126 P. 959, (1912). This 
-9-
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Court stated that the Law was to the affect 
that purchasers who buy lots with reference 
to a map or plat, which is authorized by the 
owner of the ground and which shows streets 
which are dedicated in said plat, gives to 
the lot purchasers a right to have such street 
maintained and the right to prevent the owner 
from vacating or obstructing the same. This 
Court further held that in addition to the 
public easement, that the individual purchaser 
of the lots also acquire a private easement 
and constitutes a property right which can 
only be taken from them or obstructed by 
making proper compensation therefor. 
This Court further held in the Tuttle case, 
that it is a well settled law, that a public 
street or highway may be vacated against the 
wish of abutting owners provided that just 
compensation is made to such owners. 
This Court determined similar questions 
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previously in Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County/ 
104 P. Ill, (1909). The Court held in 
Sowadzki, that in the dedication of a street/ 
a fee that is conveyed to the city is to the 
surface only and this is only for public use 
for all purposes of a street or highway/ and 
that such fee is a limited or a determinable 
fee and is created only for a special purpose 
or purposes only. 
This Court had reason to recall the previous 
decisions of the Supreme Court in dealing with 
the abandonment or transfer of title to city 
streets in the case of Boskovich vs. Midvale 
City/ 243 py2d 435/ (1952)/ wherein the Midvale 
City Corporation enacted an ordinance giving 
to the Board of Education which abutted on 
both sides of a particular public street title 
to said street and the right to close same. 
The street had been created by a private, 
recorded, and accepted subdivision in Midvale. 
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This Court held in the Boskovich case, 
that a city by ordinance may vacate or abandon 
streets, even in a subdivision, if public 
exigency requires and if procedure is followed 
satisfying the statutory requirements and 
requirements of Due Process and the considera-
tion of any substantial rights involved thereby. 
This Court holding that where a street is 
closed by ordinance, that the enactment itself 
of the ordinance is not sufficient, nor is the 
taking without just compensation. 
This Court distinguished the Boskovich case 
on the basis that it was a duly private sub-
division containing streets and alleys. The 
easement of the owners of lots in a dedicated 
subdivision have a private easement even upon 
the City's abandonment of its public easement 
and the taking of the private easement requires, 
in addition to valid Due Process hearings, the 
payment of just compensation. That the method 
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to be employed by the City in such an instance 
is through the proper use of the rights and 
powers under the statute pertaining to eminent 
domain. 
This Court had occasion to make a distinction 
as between the use of a street which constitutes 
a privilege and the use of a street which 
constitutes a property right in making its 
determination in the case of Stringham vs. Salt 
Lake City, 201 P.2d 758, and this Court quoted 
from McQuillan, Municipal Corporations/ 2nd Ed., 
Vol,' 3, Sec/ 981, p. 217; 
"ft**!^  the control of streets and 
public ways, a municipality is a 
trustee for the entire public, and 
as such trustee, it should permit 
nothing to be done that will interfere 
with the condition of the streets or 
of their free use by all alike***." 
This Court further emphasized the distinction 
as to the distinction between use and property 
rights, in citing from the case of Thompson 
vs. Smith, 155 Vt. 367, 154 S.E. 579, wherein 
-13-
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it stated: 
"Use of streets for ordinary purposes 
of life is a right. It is not a 
mere privilege like the privilege 
of moving a house in the street, 
operating a business stand in the 
street, or transporting persons or 
property for hire along the street, 
which a city may permit or prohibit 
at will." 
The Lower Court in its bench ruling in 
the instant matter (R-123, -125) summarized 
all of the arguments of the Appellants as to 
the vested rights of the Appellants in their 
claim of vested property rights to the dedicated 
street by the Court stating: 
"This is a legislative debate and 
decision and not a judicial decision 
at all. The Court refuses to take 
any action. It's strictly a legis-
lative decision. The powers and 
persons aggrieved must direct their 
grievance to the legislative branches 
of the government." 
The Appellants suggest that this Court, as 
well as the Lower Court, has a judicial right 
as well as a duty in a Complaint seeking a 
Declaratory Judgment and interpretation of 
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the action of a city governing body, to deter-
mine the meanings of statutes cited by the 
Appellants, as well as to make a determination 
of the rights and privileges of the aggrieved 
Appellants and to weigh the equities of the 
taking of the public property from its citizens 
and giving of such property without compensation 
to a Board of Education. 
The Court, in its bench ruling (R-123), 
stated that it took judicial notice of the 
State's statutes in the series 10-8-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended 1953, and in the 
series of statutes commencing at 10-8-8.1, 
which was enacted in 1955 and which the Court 
alleged set up definite procedures for vacating 
streets. The Court, thereupon, stated in the 
instant matter before this Court: 
"There is no merit in this case 
insofar as statutes are concerned. 
I believe the statutes have been 
ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Stone vs. Salt Lake City and 
other decisions in 1960 and later. 
-15-
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There is no question that a legislative 
body either County Commissioners or 
City fathers can vacate dedicated 
streets if they follow normal procedures, 
otherwise government can never change 
and that this can be done," (R-123) 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, 
that the holding in Stone vs. Salt Lake City, 
356 P.2d 631, (1960), is not at all pertinent 
to the instant matter before the Court, in 
that in the Stone case there were two issues 
involved, one being the purchase of city 
property by a church and whether or not there 
was a violation of statutory or constitutional 
law in regards thereto, the other question 
involved was whether or not a building owned 
by the city and for which it had no longer any 
use could be sold to the United States govern-
ment directly or indirectly for the purpose 
of allowing the erection of a federal building 
on such street. 
This Court did not allege that the statutes 
dealing with streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards 
-16-
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sidewalks, parks, airports, and public grounds 
was not pertinent to the use by a municipal 
government of its conduct in relation to such 
streets, alleys, etc., but ruled that in the 
Stone case, the particular statutes referred 
to were pertinent only as to such streets, 
parks, etc., but did not have application to 
the sale of a public building to which the 
city no longer had a valid use. 
The Court, in ruling in the Stone case, did 
not refer at all to the statutory series 
10-8-8.1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1955, 
but did refer to 10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated/ 
1953, after setting forth the wording of the 
statute, this Court stated: 
"The familiar and universally recognized 
rule is that general terms following 
specific terms are interpreted to mean 
things of like character. While those 
cases are sound as to streets and parks, 
(emphasis added) we can see nothing 
in that statute which would require 
. the sale of the public safety building 
to be considered as coming within its 
.., terms, nor do we find any expressed 
-17-
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provision in our statutes which 
would prohibit the procedure followed 
here." 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In Hall vs. North Ogden City; 166 P.2d 221, 
(1946), the Supreme Court traced the beginnings 
of the history of establishing dedicated tracts 
of land/ commencing with the Compiled Laws of 
1876 under the Teritorial Town Site Act, setting 
forth in that and subsequent laws, such as the 
Compiled Laws of 1888, a manner and method of 
dedicating town sites and subdivisions therein, 
together with the vesting of a trusteeship 
rights in the municipality or county governments 
providing for the vested rights of those who 
acquire lots in dedicated town sites as to 
the use of public streets, set forth in the 
dedication of such town sites or subdivisions. 
The Courts have consistently noted throughout 
—18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the entire chain of cases, such as in Tuttle 
vs. Sowadzki, supra; Knight vs. Thomas, 101 P. 
383, (1909); Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake City, 
supra; White vs. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d 210, 
C1952); Stringham vs. Salt Lake City, 201 P.2d 
758, (1949); Premium Oil Company vs. Cedar 
City, 187 P.2d 199, (1947); Bonner vs. Sudberry, 
417 P.2d 646, (1966); Mallory vs. Taggart, 
470 P.2d 254, (1970), and in many other cases 
too numerous to necessitate the listing herein, 
that there are specific Utah Statutes which 
grant specific rights to a governmental body, as 
well as stressing the proprietary and property 
rights existing in particular classes of persons 
who are part of a town site, subdivision, or 
abuttors to property, and the legislature of 
this State, as well as the previous territorial 
government, set forth specific methods of taking 
of private property, including streets of 
governmental bodies, providing at all times for 
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a Due Process method of hearing, notice, and 
compensation where there is a vested right 
in a owner of property affected. 
Other states had early developed laws along 
this line which have been subsequently adopted 
by other states from already existing laws of 
sister states in order to perfect the method 
of Due Process taking of property or in the 
dedication of streets in such states. 
Payne vs. City of Laramie, Wyoming, 398 P.2d 
557, C1965), the Supreme Court of Wyoming in 
an appeal from a lower Wyoming Court which had 
denied to Plaintiffs and Appellants the right 
to a vacated street, the City had by Quit 
Claim Deed sold a street that had been vacated, 
and held that the City of Laramie did not have 
a fee simple in the street, and held that 
where property had been dedicated, the City 
had a title in trust for the public to the 
street, and upon being vacated, the City could 
-20-
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not sell the street by a Quit Claim Deed. 
The Court held: 
"We remain of the view, that a 
dedication thereunder, absence some 
other applicable statute, does not 
vest in a municipality a fee in 
the premises set apart for streets 
which, upon vacation of the streets, 
can be bartered and sold by the 
municipality." 
In Mochel vs. Cleveland, 51 Id. 468, 5 P.2d 
549, the Court affirmed the doctrine, that 
acknowledgement and recording while equivalent 
to a deed in fee simple is not a deed in fee 
simple and does not give the public the same 
right to sell or dispose of the same that a 
private party has to land for which he holds 
the title in fee simple. The Court held, that 
there was at best a title in trust for the 
public granting the city the right to hold, 
use, occupy, and enjoy the premises for public 
use as a street, and that once that right was 
terminated by vacation pursuant to authority 
delegated to the city by the legislature, the 
-21-
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city no longer had any title or interest in 
the premises and had nothing to sell or convey. 
In the instant matter before this Court/ 
we have the undisputed evidence of the dedica-
tion of a plat upon which were set forth certain 
specific streets, wherein the dedication itself 
as set forth in the official records of the 
Ogden City Recorder, stated as follows (R-2, 
-31: 
"We, the undersigned owners of the 
land mentioned and shown on the 
annexed plat of Argonne Plat Addition, 
do hereby dedicate, grant, and convey 
unto Ogden City all those parts or 
portions of said land belonging to 
us and lying and being embraced 
within the boundaries of the streets 
and avenues as shown on the annexed 
plat, to be set apart and used as 
public thoroughfares forever." 
The legislature of the State as set forth in 
10-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, et seq., as 
well as 10-8-8.1, et seq., set out the manner 
of petitioning and hearing for the closing of 
a street. Nowhere among the quoted statutes 
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is there a direct authority by the legislature 
for the taking of private property of others, 
such as a dedicated street/ without compensation 
The Legislature has also seen fit by the 
Municipal Planning Enabling Act/ 10-9-19/ Utah 
Code Annotated/ 1953/ et seq.f to provide for 
planning by commission/ together with input 
from the citizens of the community affected/ 
as well as a long range master plan to be 
conformed to by both city and county governments 
to provide for an orderly use of property in 
the growth and development of communities/ and 
prevent the surreptitious destruction of the 
rights of the citizenry without professional 
planning and hearings in the use of areas 
within a governmental body. 
10-9-20/ Utah Code Annotated/ 1953f specifi-
cally provides that it is the function and 
duty of the Planning Commission after holding 
public hearings to make and adopt a master plan 
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for the physical development of a municipality, 
and the statute further provides in 10-9-23, 
that before there is an addition of new 
streets or vacating of a street, that before 
any such action can be taken by the legislative 
body, there shall be a public hearing thereof 
and shall be submitted to the Planning Commissior 
for its approval. It is provided in 10-9-24, 
Utah Code Annotated, amended 1953, that there 
shall be a public hearing held by the Board 
prior to its adopting any action* 
In the instant matter before the Court, the 
Planning Commission of Ogden City held the 
closure of the street as not being in the best 
interest of the citizens of the community. (R-45) 
That the only public hearing held on the matter 
was held by the Ogden City Council, whereby 
they invited the Planning Commission to be 
present at a joint meeting, which the Appellants 
submit to the Court is not the equivalent of a 
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private public meeting held by the Planning 
Commission to obtain the input from its 
citizens. 
The Weber County Planning Commission through 
its planning chairman, Graham Shiria, its 
public work director, Rulon Sorenson, and its 
traffic engineer, Don Godfrey, made a report 
to R. L. Larsen, Ogden City Manager, opposing 
the vacating of 29th Street, suggesting that 
if the school desires to enhance its campus 
continuity, that there are other esthetic 
solutions available which would provide campus 
continuity and still maintain a public street. 
CR-49, -501 
The Ogden Standard Examiner editorial (R-54) 
sets forth in general the perspective of what 
the closure of 29th Street means to the general 
citizenry as well as can be obtained from the 
exhibits tR-51, R-53, and R-55 through R-58), 
all setting forth the opposition of Argonne 
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Park Plat residents and homeowners who are 
opposed to the loss of their arterial thorough-
fare. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable 
Court, that the refusal of the Lower Court 
to make a ruling on the Complaint in Declaratory 
Judgment, and to allow an evidentiary trial 
and argument as to the merits and meaning of 
the statute and constitutional principles 
involved in the taking away and closing of a 
dedicated public street, together with the 
giving of same by Quit Claim Deed to the Ogden 
City Board of Education, all without compensa-
tion to the persons damaged and aggrieved by 
such conduct and without Due Process hearing, 
was not a legislative matter but was a matter 
for the judiciary to determine or to allow to 
proceed to a determination, and that upon the 
failure of the Lower Court to so act, that 
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the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has the 
power and duty to enter a Declaratory Judgment 
based upon the admitted facts and record before 
this Honorable Court, and that this Court should 
declare the taking of such dedicated public 
street without compensation or proper Due 
Process hearing to the Appellants and the class 
represented by the Appellants, as in contradic-
tion of the Constitution and Statutes of the 
State of Utah, and declare the act of the City 
of Ogden giving a Quit Claim Deed to said 
street to the Ogden City Board of Education 
as a nullity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By &*£??'Z2^^ 
PETE N. VLAHOS of 
VLAHOS & GALE 
Suite 312 Eccles Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Appellants 
-27-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Copies of the above and foregoing Brief of 
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